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This paper provides an alternative understanding of the substantive representation of immigrant-origin 
citizens than previous work in the "politics of presence" tradition. Instead of assuming members of 
parliaments' (MPs) intrinsic motivations to be underlying immigrants' substantive representation, we 
highlight extrinsic motives. Drawing on principal-agent theory, we conceptualise MPs as delegates 
who follow the instructions of their main principals, constituents and party bodies. On this basis, we 
study the link between institutional variables and substantive representation. Based on an analysis of 
more than 20,000 parliamentary questions for written answer tabled in the 17th German Bundestag 
(2009-13), we find that immigrants' substantive representation hinges strongly on the demands of MPs' 
principals. However, our empirical analysis suggests that electoral rules do not influence the 
relationships between MPs and their principals, while candidate selection methods as well as powerful 
parliamentary party group leaderships do. 
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The normative ideal of democratic representation (e.g. Dahl 1971) suggests that as more 
immigrant-origin residents acquire citizenship and thus the right to vote, their interests should 
find more consideration in the parliamentary activities of members of parliament (MPs). 
Indeed, the relevance of this ideal should not be underestimated, given that immigrants and 
their descendants remain socially and economically disadvantaged in most Western 
democracies of immigration (Alba and Foner 2015). Consequently, political scientists are 
called for to examine the mechanisms underlying the substantive representation of 
disadvantaged immigrant groups.  
Conceptually, substantive representation refers to whether MPs “act in the interest of” 
citizens, while descriptive representation refers to whether MPs’ sociodemographic features 
“stand for” a certain group of citizens (Pitkin 1967). Despite this conceptual differentiation, 
however, normative claims of a connection between the two concepts of representation 
(Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995) has inspired the lion’s share of previous research on 
immigrants’ substantive representation (e.g. Aydemir and Vliegenthart 2016; Hänni 2017; 
Saalfeld 2011; Saalfeld and Bischof 2013; Wüst 2014a). Doubtlessly, this literature has 
advanced our understanding considerably, confirming by and large a link between the 
descriptive and substantive representation of immigrant-origin citizens. Nevertheless, it is no 
secret that immigrant-origin citizens remain descriptively underrepresented in Western 
European parliaments (Alba and Foner 2015; Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst 2011; Bloemraad and 
Schönwälder 2013). Therefore, this group of citizens has to rely by large on the level of 
substantive representation provided by native MPs. There is, however, a dearth of research on 
immigrants’ substantive representation unrelated to MPs’ own national or ethnic backgrounds. 
Consequently, rather than relying on the assumption of intrinsically motivated “descriptive” 
MPs, we think in this paper of MPs as delegates who act based on the instructions of their 
most important principals: local voters as well as political party bodies inside and outside 
parliament (Carey 2009; Strøm 2000). Speaking on behalf of immigrants and their 
descendants is understood as being part of MPs’ strategies to please the demands of their 
principals. Yet, the incentive to please the demands of one principal at the expense of another 
one is a function of the institutional environment. On one hand, MPs favour the demands of a 
centralised party body under party-centred electoral rules, a centralised candidate selection 
method and due to powerful parliamentary party groups (PPGs). On the other, they are 
“pulled” towards local demands by candidate-centred electoral rules and a localised candidate 
selection method (Carey and Shugart 1995; Gallagher 1988; Strøm 1997).  
The question arises what happens when the incentives encoded in these institutional features 
conflict (Martin 2014; Preece 2014). Do MPs remain responsive to the local demands of 
immigrant-origin citizens when a decentralised candidate selection method clashes with party-
centred electoral rules? Do they remain responsive to the demands of the PPG leadership 
when electoral rules are candidate-centred? To examine these questions, we turn to a case 
study of MPs’ legislative behaviour in the German Bundestag, a complex institutional context 
combining mixed electoral rules with a localised candidate selection method and tightly 
organised PPGs. Here, MPs are “pulled” by their principals’ demands in different directions, 
thus providing researchers the opportunity to better disentangle the effects of institutional 
variables while holding country-specific context fixed. Empirically, this study is based on a 
dataset of all MPs serving in the 17th Bundestag (2009-13), combined with a semi-automated 
content analysis of more than 20,000 of their parliamentary questions (PQs) for written 
answer.  
Quantitative analyses of this dataset show that principals’ demands are important 
determinants of the substantive representation of disadvantaged immigrant groups in MPs’ 
PQs. However, our findings provide little support that different electoral rules moderate MPs’ 
attentiveness towards the demands of their principals. A localised candidate selection on the 
one hand and powerful PPG leaderships on the other, by contrast, are found to be more 
consequential for the substantive representation of disadvantaged immigrant groups.   
Institutional Context and the Substantive Representation of 
Disadvantaged Immigrant Groups 
 
A major controversy in political science is the question of whether MPs should be 
conceptualised as trustees, who act based on their own consciousness, or as delegates, who 
act based on the instructions of others (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005; Converse and Pierce 
1986; Pitkin 1967). Conceptualising MPs as trustees means in large parts to assume that MPs’ 
intrinsic motivations underlie their legislative behaviour. This is basically what normative 
arguments in the “politics of presence” school of thought are based on. In order to represent 
the interests of disadvantaged groups, representatives need to have a thorough understanding 
of and similar life experiences to the represented, which can be best achieved by descriptive 
representation (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995:159). Previous empirical research in this line 
of thought (e.g. Aydemir and Vliegenthart 2016; Hänni 2017; Saalfeld 2011; Saalfeld and 
Bischof 2013; Wüst 2014a) is thus widely based on the assumption that MPs’ legislative 
behaviour hinges on their intrinsic motivations, that is, on the trustee notion of substantive 
representation.  
Conceptualising MPs as delegates, however, makes us aware that substantive representation 
may also be based on demands external to MPs’ consciousness and personal experiences. In 
this view, MPs act as agents of principals who control access to certain goods that MPs value 
(Carey 2009; Strøm 2000). The assumption is that MPs are driven by their ambition to reach 
certain career related goals, ordered in the following way. First of all, MPs need to achieve 
reselection as a necessary precondition for their second goal, reelection, which in turn is a 
necessary condition for the achievement of their third goal, access to positions of influence 
within parliament, such as committee chairs or front-bench membership (Strøm 1997). The 
achievement of the first goal, reselection, is in most parliamentary democracies controlled by 
parties’ nomination conventions (Müller 2000). The second goal, reelection, can only be 
achieved, if enough voters support the candidate or the party list bearing him/her (Mitchell 
2000). And the third goal, positions of legislative influence, is in most cases under control of 
the leadership of the PPG (Carey 2009). Thus, MPs typically find themselves in the difficult 
situation of having to please the demands of (at times) three different principals: voters, party 
selectorates and PPG leaders.  
In the view of principal-agent theory, MPs’ acting on behalf of disadvantaged immigrant 
groups can be therefore understood as being part of a strategy supposed to please the demands 
of one or several principals. The extent to which the demands of one principal outweigh the 
demands of another one, however, depends on the relative value of the resources that are 
controlled by each principal, which is determined by the rules of the game, that is, their 
institutional environment (cf. Carey 2009:14). Among the most important institutional 
variables are electoral rules, candidate selection methods and the internal organisation of 
parliaments.  
Electoral rules, to begin with, are commonly thought to determine how much local voter 
groups weigh in light of MPs’ reelection prospects relative to the weight of the party branch 
controlling the candidate selection process. Under closed-list PR elections, voters have little 
leverage to change the electoral fate of individual candidates, given they are confronted with 
fixed and often long lists of candidates, which voters can only take or defect as a whole 
(Carey and Shugart 1995; Mitchell 2000). The list position allocated in the selection process 
will thus literally determine MPs’ future electoral prospects, such that MPs should have 
strong incentives to follow the demands of a party selectorate (Carey 2009). By contrast, in 
more candidate-centred systems, like single-member district elections, voters have more 
influence over the electoral fate of individual candidates, such that MPs should cultivate a 
relatively stronger local voter support (Carey and Shugart 1995). Therefore, MPs should see 
more reasons to provide substantive representation in response to local concentrations of 
immigrant-origin citizens when elected in single-member districts. To the contrary, the 
demands of national party bodies should weigh stronger on MPs’ shoulders with regard to the 
representation of immigrants’ interests under closed-list PR rules. 
The candidate selection method is another factor that can be plausibly assumed to affect the 
relationship between MPs and their principals. As already mentioned, reselection is a 
necessary precondition for all other career-related goals, such that MPs can be assumed to 
owe part of their loyalty to the gatekeepers in the candidate selection process (Müller 2000). 
In this respect, the degree of territorial decentralisation is an important dimension of candidate 
selection (Rahat and Hazan 2001). Arguably, local party organisations should attach greater 
weight to the local visibility of their parliamentary representatives while national party 
headquarters should value MPs’ efforts to cultivate a national party reputation (Gallagher 
1988:15; Karlsen and Narud 2013). Given the reputation and visibility of national MPs, their 
legislative behaviour should serve local party branches as an important campaigning tool for 
the purpose of tapping on local voter markets of immigrant-origin citizens in municipality 
elections. If local party branches have leverage over the reselection of MPs, they possess a 
means to that end, that is, the means to make their parliamentary agents speak on behalf of 
disadvantaged immigrant groups. Thus, the link between local concentrations of immigrant-
origin citizens and their substantive representation may be the result of a localised candidate 
selection method. On the other hand, if the national party headquarters maintain control over 
the reselection of MPs, the demand of this principal should determine immigrants’ substantive 
representation more strongly. 
A third institutional factor, the internal organisation of parliaments, entails that MPs are 
agents of their PPG leaderships. In order to make parliamentary decision-making work, 
parliaments are complex and tightly organised institutions ensuring vertical and horizontal 
coordination of MPs’ legislative activities (Cox 2006). Vertical coordination is typically 
provided by hierarchically organised PPGs, through which the leadership remains informed 
about backbenchers’ legislative activities, controls their access to positions of influence, and 
has also the possibility to impose sanctions on them (Aldrich 1995; Saalfeld and Strøm 2014; 
Strøm 1997). Horizontal coordination cuts across this vertical hierarchy through policy-
specialised committees entailing a division of labour between MPs (Mattson and Strøm 1995). 
However, due to the tight vertical organisation of PPGs in most parliamentary democracies, 
vertical and horizontal coordination interact. That is, the vertical grip of PPG leaders over 
MPs’ legislative activities reach down into their committee work (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 
Damgaard 1995; Strøm 1998). Therefore, MPs have incentives to cater the interests of their 
PPGs through policy specialisation in a wide range of legislative activities. Thus, if the 
substantive representation of immigrant-origin citizens is in the interest of their PPGs, MPs 




MPs, their Principals and the Substantive Representation of 
Disadvantaged Immigrant Groups in the German Bundestag  
 
To put this theoretical framework to the test, we focus on Germany for two main reasons. 
First, Germany is a very relevant case to the study of immigrants’ substantive representation. 
Germany accounts for 20% of the entire immigrant population in the European Union (OECD 
and EU 2015:40) and the immigrant-origin electorate is sizeable, amounting to 9% in the 
2013 Bundestag elections (Bundeswahlleiter 2013). At the same time, however, there are 
strong structural inequalities separating immigrants’ social and economic situations from 
those of the German majority population (cf. Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für 
Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration 2016).  
Second, Germany’s institutional environment offers the opportunity to analyse and contrast 
the effects of institutional variables on the relationship between MPs and their principals. 
German MPs find themselves in a complex institutional environment combining mixed 
electoral rules with a localised candidate selection procedure and tightly organised PPGs. This 
environment provides researchers the opportunity to better disentangle the effects of these 
factors while holding constant influences of country-specific context (e.g. Moser and Scheiner 
2012:46).  
Indeed, it remains a matter of controversy whether electoral rules trump the effects of 
candidate selection methods and legislative organisation, or vice versa. Shugart and coauthors 
(2005, p. 441) argue, for example, that parties and MPs alike respond mainly to voters’ 
informational demands encoded in the electoral system, and not, for example, to party-related 
candidate selection procedures. However, others have argued that centralised candidate 
selection methods and powerful PPG leaders make MPs have weaker constituency relations 
despite strong personal vote-seeking incentives encoded in electoral rules  (Martin 2014; 
Preece 2014). In this article, we take these opposing views as an empirical question 
leveraging Germany as an institutional environment in which principals “pull” their MPs into 
different directions. 
In Germany’s electoral system, 299 MPs are elected in single-member plurality districts 
(SMD tier), and a slightly larger number of MPs is elected in 16 multi-member districts under 
rules of closed-list proportional representation (PR tier). Thus, there is within-country 
variation in electoral rules. At the same time, however, candidates are selected in a strongly 
localised fashion. Formally, the electoral law stipulates that candidates in the SMD tier must 
be selected in local constituencies while candidates in the PR tier must be selected by 
nomination conferences at the upper regional level (Detterbeck 2016). However, the electoral 
law permits candidates to run as “double candidates”, that is, in both electoral tiers 
simultaneously. In fact, double candidacy is very common practice, because voters reward 
parties electorally for the local presence of candidates (Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; 
Hainmueller and Kern 2008). Therefore, parties have vote-seeking incentives to require that 
their candidates are selected in the SMD tier before being allowed access to promising party 
list positions in the PR tier (Detterbeck 2016; Manow 2013:289). In the legislative period 
under study (2009-13), for instance, 96% of MPs elected in the PR tier were elected as double 
candidates and therefore encountered a selection process that started with their selection at the 
local level. In other words, as local re-selection is a precondition for realistic list positions in 
the PR tier, local reselection is de-facto a requirement for MPs’ reelection in both electoral 
tiers.  
The combination of varying electoral rules and a localised candidate selection process helps 
disentangling the effects of the underlying incentives to speak on behalf of immigrants and 
their descendants. Specifically, in line with Crisp, we argue that the finding of behavioural 
homogeneity across electoral tiers can be taken as evidence that the incentives 
institutionalized in the electoral tiers are being trumped by the candidate selection process 
(Crisp 2007:1462). In other words, if the locus of candidate selection is the driving force 
behind German MPs’ responsiveness to the demands of local immigrant-origin citizens and 
not their election in single-member districts, then MPs should respond to the share of 
immigrant-origin citizens in the constituency where they were locally selected. Thus, our first 
hypothesis reads:  
H1: MPs are more responsive to immigrant-origin citizens’ interests the more immigrant-
origin voters reside in their local constituencies, regardless of their election mode.  
To the contrary, by following the argument that MPs’ responsiveness to local demands is 
mainly determined by the personal vote-seeking incentives encoded in different electoral 
rules, a second hypothesis can be derived:  
H2: MPs are more responsive to immigrant-origin citizens’ interests the more immigrant-
origin voters reside in their local constituencies, conditional on their election in a single-
member district. 
MPs’ responsiveness to the demands of their PPG leaderships is influenced by the way 
parliament is organised. In this regard, the Bundestag is a paradigmatic case of a party-
controlled Arbeitsparlament (“working parliament”) based on the division of labour in policy-
specialised committees (Miller and Stecker 2008). Indeed, given that there are almost ten 
times more committee meetings than plenary meetings throughout a legislative term, 
committees are the backbone of German MPs’  legislative activities (Ismayr 2012:162). 
However, PPG leaderships maintain strong control of their MPs’ committee work, as they 
have the prerogative of assigning MPs to, and withdrawing them from committees (Damgaard 
1995; Miller and Stecker 2008). The strong control of parties is reflected in the fact that 
committees work behind closed doors, therefore only visible to the PPG leadership as a 
principal. Party control is further ensured by weekly held meetings of PPGs’ working groups 
mirroring the committee structure for the purpose of before-committee meeting coordination 
(Miller and Stecker 2008). Accordingly, we argue that MPs are supposed to serve their PPGs 
as delegates in their committees as well as in remaining legislative activities by representing 
the official position of the national party. If they refuse to represent that position, the PPG 
leadership can apply several means of sanctioning. These range from subtle persuasion and 
threats, to the withdrawal of the committee seat, to the ultimate denial of upward promotion 
within the hierarchy of the PPG (Damgaard 1995; Ismayr 2012:169).  
Empirically, we thus expect PPG leaderships’ influence on the substantive representation of 
disadvantaged immigrant groups to be reflected in an interaction between MPs’ committee 
assignment and parties’ policy programmes. As MPs’ policy-specialisation is reflected in their 
committee assignments, they should be more likely to engage in the substantive representation 
of immigrant-origin citizens if they sit on committees more likely to deal with matters of 
immigrants’ disadvantage, for example on the committee for social affairs or education rather 
than on the committee for environment or defence. However, the influence of the committee 
assignment is contingent on the national policy programmes of their parties. Here, it is 
plausible to assume that left-leaning party programmes are more inclined to improve the 
living conditions of immigrants and their descendants than right-leaning party programmes 
(Bird et al. 2011; Messina 2007). To borrow the words of Anthony Messina, “the left’s 
traditional policy agenda tends to dovetail with the perceived interests of immigrants. 
Specifically, the proclivity of the left to privilege the goals of full employment, greater 
socioeconomic equality, universal health care, a vibrant public educational system, racial 
equality and so on intersects with the material and subjective aspirations of immigrant voters 
who generally find themselves socioeconomically disadvantaged or the objects of racial 
prejudice or social exclusion” (Messina 2007:208).  
Our third hypothesise is therefore: 
H3: MPs are more responsive to immigrant-origin citizens’ interests when they sit for left-
leaning parties on migrant-related committees as compared to right-leaning MPs or MPs who 
sit for left-leaning MPs on other committees (H3). 
Proponents of electoral system effects, by contrast, would argue that MPs’ incentives to 
cultivate a collective party reputation are stronger under closed-list PR than under SMD 
elections. Thus a fourth hypothesis is: 
H4: The effect of membership in a migrant-related committee is stronger for left-wing MPs 
elected in the PR tier than for left-wing MPs elected in the SMD tier (H4). 
Data and Methods 
Measuring Substantive Representation in Parliamentary Questions 
To test the hypotheses laid out in the previous section, we follow previous research in the 
field and draw on parliamentary questions (PQs) for written answer (Schriftliche Fragen) as 
indicators of substantive representation (Aydemir and Vliegenthart 2016; Saalfeld 2011; 
Saalfeld and Bischof 2013; Wüst 2014a). PQs are well suited to deal with our research 
question, because they indicate MPs’ personal efforts to represent the interests of 
disadvantaged immigrant groups. Other readily available legislative activities, for example 
speeches or roll call votes, are strictly control by the PPG leadership, especially in a strongly 
party-controlled parliament like the Bundestag (Depauw and Martin 2009; Proksch and Slapin 
2015). In comparison, PQs are among the least party controlled parliamentary activities. 
Therefore, MPs can use them relatively freely to raise the attention of the government to 
certain issues, to acquire information from the bureaucracy or to claim credit for their PQs in 
their websites, social media or local newspapers (Keh 2015; Martin 2011a, 2011b; Rozenberg 
and Martin 2011; Russo and Wiberg 2010).  
While it remains relatively undisputed that PQs can serve MPs for the purpose of cultivating 
local voter support (Fernandes, Leston-Bandeira, and Schwemmer 2017; Martin 2011b; Russo 
2011; Saalfeld 2011), it is not as common to use PQs as a measure of MPs’ responsiveness to 
the demands of PPGs (but see Bailer 2011; Otjes and Louwerse 2018). However, the fact that 
the usage of PQs is less constrained by the PPG leadership is not to say that MPs cannot use 
PQs to please the demands of their PPG leaderships. Rather, PPG leaderships should 
appreciate MPs’ questioning activities. One of the many functions of PQs is information 
acquisition in order to reduce the knowledge asymmetry vis-à-vis government departments 
(Russo and Wiberg 2010). This applies especially to PPGs in the opposition, but also to PPGs 
in government coalitions, for example to keep tabs on the government departments held by 
coalition partners. In this regard, information is power and MPs’ questioning behaviour can 
serve PPGs as an important source of information retrieval. Therefore, MPs can use PQs to 
please this demand. However, in difference to other legislative activities, for example 
speeches or roll call voting, MPs can choose to cater their PPG leaderships with PQs, but will 
not be immediately punished if a PQ is aimed at cultivating the support of other principals, for 
example local voters. 
Consequently, we compiled all 20,130 PQs tabled by individual MPs in the 17th German 
Bundestag. In order to identify PQs tabled on behalf of disadvantaged immigrant groups, we 
focus on the representation of their objective interests rather than on the representation of 
their subjective interests (for a detailed discussion see Swain 1993:6). That is, PQs are 
understood to be substantively representative if they raise attention to immigrants’ unequal 
living conditions, for example in terms of level of income, physical well-being or employment 
status, and/or demand the integration of immigrant-origin residents into German society. 
Integration refers here, according to Alba and Foner, to processes that increase the 
opportunities of immigrants and their descendants in major institutions such as the 
educational and political system and the labour and housing market (Alba and Foner 2015:5). 
In order to identify PQs tabled on behalf of disadvantaged immigrant groups, herein called 
integration-related PQs, we combine human and dictionary-based machine coding. A detailed 
description of the text coding procedure and its validation, the final list of key words, as well 
as two examples of such questions are provided in the appendix A1 and A2 to this paper. 
Based on this coding, the final measure of our dependent variables is the count of integration-
related PQs per MP.  
Independent and Control Variables 
We measure the magnitude of the local demand of immigrant-origin citizens as the share of 
foreign nationals in the local district and connect this information to all MPs who are running 
in the election as SMD tier candidates. Thus, all dually nominated MPs are linked to the 
constituencies in which they were selected to run as SMD tier candidates. PR tier legislators 
who did not run as a candidate in a district race (15 out of 652 legislators overall which equals 
2.3%) were excluded from the analysis. Of course, using the percentage of foreign nationals 
as a proxy for the immigrant-origin electorate at the constituency-level is not ideal. 
Nevertheless, it is the only immigrant-related indicator available at the constituency-level, and 
given it is highly correlated (r=0.78) with the group of naturalised residents of immigrant-
origin at the level of differently drawn administrative districts (Wüst 2014b) we take this 
indicator as a reasonable approximation of the immigrant-origin electorate. The difference 
between SMD and PR tier MPs is captured in a dummy variable which takes values of one for 
SMD MPs. Party differences are captured in a set of five dummy variables for each PPG 
respectively, and also in a dummy for the simple left/right distinction, in which we categorise 
the CDU/CSU and the FDP as right-wing parties and the SPD, Greens and The Left as left-
wing parties. For the purpose of identifying migrant-related committees, we rely on a 
modified categorisation of the dichotomous categorisation scheme proposed by Wüst (Wüst 
2011)1. 
In order to test whether the theoretical framework proposed in this article contributes 
significantly to established explanations, we also add a control variable for the effect of 
descriptive representation as the main focus of previous research. We identified all MPs as 
being of immigrant-origin (n=24) if they were born with a foreign nationality or if one of the 
respective person’s parents was born with a foreign nationality. In addition to that, we control 
for the total number of PQs asked per MP. Since the extent to which PQs are used overall 
should depend on MPs’ government or opposition status as well as on their seniority and 
career stages (Bailer and Ohmura 2017), we control for these factors implicitly when 
including this variable. Table 1 provides a descriptive overview of all variables.  
Table 1: Descriptives     




No. of integration-related PQs 0 52 0.83 3.86 
% Foreign Nationals in District 0.01 0.28 0.09 0.05 
PR (0) vs. SMD tier(1) 0 1 0.47 - 
Party: Right (0) vs. Left (1) 0 1 0.46 - 
Dummy: CDU/CSU 0 1 0.38 - 
Dummy: FDP 0 1 0.15 - 
Dummy: SPD 0 1 0.23 - 
Dummy: Greens 0 1 0.11 - 
Dummy: The Left 0 1 0.11 - 
Other (0) vs. immigrant-related 
committee (1) 
0 1 0.47 - 
Native (0) vs. migratory 
background (1) 
0 1 0.04 - 
Total no. of PQs 0 196 30.68 44.58 
Observations 637       
 
Statistical Model 
The empirical modelling strategy must take into account two related methodological aspects. 
First, as our unit of analysis is the MP and the dependent variable captures counts of 
integration-related questions asked per MP, negative-binomial regression models are an 
appropriate choice.2 Second, the number of zeros in our dependent variable amounts to 527 
out of 637 or 82.7%. Zeros may be generated according to two different mechanisms. First, an 
MP decides not to ask a single integration-related PQ. Second, an MP decides not to ask any 
PQs at all. The latter mechanism is strongly related to the tendency of MPs representing 
government parties to ask no or only few PQs, while MPs of opposition parties typically ask a 
lot more PQs. Obviously, a major precondition to the tabling of integration-related questions 
is that an MP asks PQs at all. In our dataset 399 out of 637 MPs asked at least one PQ, and 
110 MPs asked at least one integration-related question.  
 
Figure 1.  Percentages of MPs by party tabling no PQ, at least one PQ but no integration-related PQs, or at least one 
integration-related PQ. 
Figure 13 confirms this suspicion by showing the distribution of MPs who either tabled no 
PQs, at least one PQ but no integration-related PQs, or at least one integration-related PQ. In 
comparison to government MPs (CDU/CSU, FDP), members of opposition parties (The Left, 
SPD, Greens) are more likely to table more PQs overall. This is especially problematic since 
in the legislative term under study the division between opposition and government was clear-
cut with regard to the left/ right divide. In order to better disentangle party and opposition 
effects and better handle the zero-inflation in our dependant variable we fit zero-inflated 
negative binomial regression models. These models are mixture models that combine two 
regression equations, a logit model to explain the zero inflation, and a negative binomial 
model to explain non-zero counts in the dependant variable (Cameron and Trivedi 2013:111–
76). In order to explain MPs’ propensity of asking at least one integration-related PQ, we 
include the total number of PQs asked by each MP in the inflation equation4. Doing so allows 
us to control for factors that make MPs ask no or few PQs at all, as outlined in the previous 
section, in the explanations of zero-observations.  
Results 
 
In Table 2 we present the results of four estimated zero-inflated regression models. The 
models estimate in the count regression equation the effects of the independent and control 
variables on the number of integration-related PQs MPs have asked throughout the 17th 
Bundestag. Model 1 includes the local share of foreign nationals and the distinction between 
MPs’ election modes without their interaction (H1), while Model 2 extends the regression 
model by the interaction between the two variables (H2). The positive and statistically 
significant coefficient (p < 0.05) of the foreigner share in Model 1 suggests that MPs increase 
their number of integration-related PQs as the share of foreign nationals rises in their local 
constituencies in which they were selected. Adding the interaction term in Model 2 further 
shows that this link is not different for MPs elected in the SMD as compared to MPs elected 
in the PR tier. Here the coefficient for the share of foreign nationals, which stands for the 
constituency effect of list MPs, is still positive and remains statistically significant at p < 0.1. 
However, the coefficient of the interaction term does not come anywhere close to 
conventional levels of statistical significance (p = 0.691).  
Table 2: Determinants of the number of integration-related PQs   
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Negative binomial count model:         
% Foreign Nationals: 0.06** 0.06* 0.06** 0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
SMD MP: -0.14 -0.29 -0.08  
 (0.28) (0.42) (0.25)  
% Foreign Nationals *   0.02   
SMD MP:  (0.04)   
     
Reference category: SPD     
CDU/CSU -0.83* -0.86*   
 (0.48) (0.45)   
FDP -2.30*** -2.30***   
 (0.82) (0.81)   
Greens 0.12 0.12   
 (0.33) (0.33)   
The Left 0.37 0.39   
 (0.34) (0.35)   
     
Migrant-related  0.93*** 0.94***   
Committee (0.26) (0.26)   
Migratory background 1.27*** 1.28*** 1.30*** 1.28*** 
 (0.43) (0.43) (0.45) (0.45) 
     
Reference category: Left-wing 
MP/other committee 
    
Left-wing MP/migrant-related    1.00***  
   committee   (0.29)  
Right-wing MP/other committee   -1.02  
   (0.63)  
Right-wing MP/migrant-related    -0.31  
   committee   (0.67)  
     
Reference category: PR/right-     
wing/other committee     
PR/left-wing/ other committee     2.23* 
    (1.15) 
SMD/left-wing/other committee  
  2.21* 
 
   (1.16) 
PR/left-wing/migrant-related  
  3.29*** 
   committee  
  (1.14) 
SMD/left-wing/migrant-related    3.00** 
   committee    (1.16) 
SMD/right-wing/other committee  
  1.53 
    (1.20) 
PR/right-wing/migrant-related     2.06* 
   committee    (1.17) 
SMD/right-wing/migrant-related     1.74 
   committee    (1.19) 
Intercept -0.75** -0.71* -0.68** -2.89*** 
 (0.37) (0.40) (0.33) (1.17) 
Zero-inflation logit model:         
Total no. of PQs -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Intercept 2.17*** 2.15*** 2.26*** 2.24*** 
 (0.42) (0.41) (0.40) (0.40) 
          
Intercept alpha 0.78*** 0.78*** 0.81*** 0.80*** 
  (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) 
N 637 637 637 637 
Nonzero N 110 110 110 110 
BIC 943.76 950.07 934.57 951.91 
Note: Zero-inflated negative binomial regression models; Table entries show 
unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Figure 2 visualises these effects. Based on model 1, the left-hand panel5 shows how the 
predicted number of integration-related PQs changes when the foreign national share 
increases from roughly two standard deviations below the mean up to two standard deviations 
above the mean. The predicted change is roughly one integration-related PQ. While this effect 
may seem substantially negligible it is important to note that the mean number of integration-
related PQs for our analysis is only at 0.83. Moreover, the share of foreign nationals only 
serves here as a proxy for the size of the immigrant-origin electorate, therefore potentially 
underestimating the real effect size. Based on model 2, the right-hand panel of figure 2 shows 
the marginal effect of being an SMD MP conditional on the local share of foreign nationals. 
As can be seen, the election mode does not interact with the size of the immigrant electorate 
in the constituency. Overall, these findings support H1 but not H2.  
 
Figure 2. MPs’ integration-related PQs in response to local demands with 95% confidence intervals 
 
Model 3 includes a combination of the two dummy variables measuring, on the one hand, 
whether MPs represent a left or right-leaning party, and on the other hand, whether they sit on 
a migrant-related committee or not. The coefficients show that compared to the reference 
category of left-leaning MPs who do not sit on migrant-related committees, MPs who sit for 
left-leaning parties on migrant-related committees ask significantly more integration-related 
PQs. To the contrary, MPs representing right-leaning parties do not differ significantly from 
the reference category. We visualise this finding in the left panel of Figure 3 as predicted 
counts of integration-related PQs per committee/party combination. It corroborates H3, 
namely that the combination of leftist party ideology and assignment to migrant-related 
committees increases the number of PQs that MPs ask on behalf of disadvantaged immigrant 
groups. 
 
Figure 3. MPs’ integration-related PQs in response to PPGs’ demands with 95% confidence intervals 
In model 4 we intend to test for whether MPs’ election mode can improve the statistical 
explanation of this variation (H4). For that purpose we turn the previously used two-way 
combination of variables into a three-way combination by adding MPs’ election mode (SMD 
versus PR tier). Since this regression table is an unwieldy format to assess the model 
coefficients, we only report these results for transparency reasons, but direct the reader to the 
visualisation of the predicted counts of integration-related PQs shown in the right panel of 
Figure 3. In this visualisation, the left/right PPG distinction is held at “left-wing”, while MPs 
committee assignments and election modes vary. As can be seen, the effect of the committee 
assignment does not vary greatly between MPs’ elected in the PR and SMD tier and the 
confidence intervals are widely overlapping. Therefore, H4 cannot be supported based on this 
empirical evidence. 
Furthermore, in all four models it is found that MPs of immigrant-origin are significantly 
more likely to ask integration-related questions, corroborating findings from previous studies. 
However, the empirical evidence shows that descriptive representation is only part of the 
story of immigrants’ substantive representation 
In summary, our findings suggest, first, that MPs tend to ask more integration-related PQs the 
more foreign nationals reside in local constituencies where they were selected to run as 
district candidates. Second, they ask more of those questions when they sit for left-wing 
parties on committees more likely to deal with matters of immigrants’ integration. Third, 
these relationships exist irrespective of MPs’ own national backgrounds and regardless of 
whether they were elected under SMD or PR electoral rules in Germany’s mixed-member 
system. This conclusion is also supported by a comparison of BIC values across the four 
models. Model 3, which models the direct effect of the share of foreign nationals in a 
constituency and the party-committee interaction, turns out to have the lowest BIC value and 
hence the best model fit.  
Our results are robust to different modelling strategies. As robustness checks we refitted the 
models as standard negative binomial regression models on the whole sample of MPs as well 
as on a reduced sample of MPs who have asked at least one PQ. The corresponding models 
are shown in tables A3 and A4 in the appendix and provide the same substantive results as 
those presented in our main analysis. 
Concluding remarks 
 
Western representative democracies face new challenges due to the pressures of large-scale 
immigration creating multi-ethnic societies (Bird et al. 2011). Drawing on principal-agent 
theory, this paper examines how institutional factors shape MPs’ responsiveness to the 
disadvantages that immigrants and their descendants face in German society. Arguing that the 
role of native MPs has been underappreciated in previous research, we conceptualise MPs 
irrespective of their own national backgrounds as delegates who act based on the instructions 
of their most important principals: local constituents, party selectorates and PPGs. This 
analytical perspective constitutes a contrast to the “politics of presence” approach, which sees 
MPs rather as trustees whose consciousness and personal experiences determine their 
legislative behaviour (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995). However, we do not seek to belittle 
previous work based on the trustee conception. Rather, we argue that in order to improve our 
knowledge of the political representation of disadvantaged immigrant groups, it is fruitful to 
investigate relevant phenomena through a variety of analytical perspectives. 
Drawing on a new dataset which includes a corpus of all 20,130 parliamentary questions 
(PQs) tabled by individual MPs in the 17th Bundestag, we find that the demands of MPs’ 
principals shape profoundly the substantive representation of disadvantaged immigrant groups 
in PQs. Moreover, the German institutional context, which confronts MPs with mixed 
electoral rules, a localised candidate selection process and tightly organised PPGs, allows us 
further to derive competing hypotheses about the behavioural consequences of these 
institutional features. Putting these hypotheses to the test, our empirical results provide little 
support for the idea that differences in electoral rules shape immigrants’ substantive 
representation in MPs’ parliamentary questions. However, our findings do suggest, first, that 
MPs’ responsiveness to local concentrations of immigrant-origin citizens hinges on a 
localised candidate selection method. Second, their responsiveness to the demands of national 
party bodies to speak on behalf of disadvantaged immigrant groups is a consequence of 
tightly organised PPGs in the Bundestag.  
Taken together, our study makes therefore two important contributions to the literature. First, 
it shows that our understanding of the substantive representation of immigrant-origin 
minorities can be advanced by conceptualising MPs irrespective of their national backgrounds 
as delegates of principals inside and outside parliament. Second, this paper outlines also the 
limits of institutional explanations given the finding that candidate selection rules and 
legislative organisation are found to outperform electoral rules in their effects on immigrants’ 
substantive representation in MPs’ parliamentary questions.  
Thus, future research should recognise more strongly the role of native MPs and the factors 
that affect their legislative behaviour. As long as different immigrant groups remain 
descriptively underrepresented in national legislatures, native MPs remain the most important 
vessel for this group’s substantive representation. In other words, more research is needed to 
better understand MPs’ legislative behaviour irrespective of their national backgrounds.  
In this regard, our study of the German case is a first step. Comparative research conducts would 
be a valuable extension to the present study in order to deepen our understanding of the 
consequences of candidate selection and legislative organisation for substantive representation 
across different electoral system regimes. Moreover, future research may also include other 
characteristics of MPs’ institutional environments. For example, in many party-centred 
electoral systems national MPs pursue local political careers simultaneously (Fernandes et al. 
2017; Russo 2011) or are subject to powerful local party branches in other ways (Tavits 
2011). These factors can have the effect that MPs remain responsive to the demands of local 
concentrations of immigrant-origin citizens despite party-centred electoral rules. Given its 
parsimony, principal-agent theory should be a useful tool to explore the consequences of these 
factors in other parliamentary democracies, as well. In this light, the present contribution 
should be understood as a point of departure for future studies interested in the political 
representation of immigrants and their descendants in Western democracies.  
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Notes 
1 Immigrant-related committees are labour and social affairs; education and research; family, elderly and 
women; domestic affairs; culture and media; human rights; economic development; petitions; and the 
investigation committee on the fascist terror of the “Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund” (NSU).   
2 We chose a negative binomial model as diagnostics for a poisson model indicated overdispersion. Vuong tests 
further provided strong support for the use of zero-inflated mixture models. 
3 All figures shown in this paper were generated using the Stata scheme plotplain (Bischof 2017). 
4 We tested other specifications of the zero -inflation equation, including other variables used in the count 
equation. However, since these variables did not turn out to be significant and further increased the complexity 
of the models without improving their explanatory power indicated by a growing BIC value (Bayesian 
Information Criterion), we decided against their inclusion.   
5 Following suggestions of Hanmer and Kalkan, all predicted values of the dependent variable and marginal 
effects shown in Figures 2 and 3 are based on the empirical observed values of remaining variables in the 











                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Appendix 
 
A1: Measuring “integration-related” PQs 
The texts of German PQs were extracted from official online archives of the Bundestag using 
Python programming scripts. All files were available as PDF documents and were converted 
to raw text. Subsequently, several string matching procedures were used to isolate questions 
and subsequently match them with MP-level information.  
The measurement goal is to identify PQs that raise attention to and demand the improvement 
of the living conditions of immigrants and their descendants. It is important to note that we do 
not intend to capture sceptical positions on the integration of immigrant-origin residents, i.e. 
content that relates to the protection of German national identity or expresses reservations 
against the integration of immigrants and multicultural society. In other words, our measure 
should not be mistaken as a measure of saliency or positioning on a pro- vs. anti-immigrant 
continuum.  
The following two translated examples illustrate how parliamentary written questions are used 
by MPs in order to raise attention to and demand the improvement of the living conditions of 
immigrants and their descendants. 
„How does the government justify the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees recent 
announcement to cut the budget for integration courses in the light of the CDU, CSU and 
FPDs‘ coalition agreements‘ plan to qualitatively and quantitatively upgrade those courses?” 
(PQ tabled by Aydan Özoğuz, SPD, May 7th 2010) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
„… how does the government want to ensure that the Federal Employment Office will bring 
residents with a migratory background into vocational training in similar proportions in their 
respective age groups as compared to Germans.” (PQ tabled by Mechthild Rawert, SPD, 
March 18th 2011) 
Ideally, in order to identify integration-related PQs, every single question in our corpus would 
be inspected qualitatively to determine whether it addresses immigrants’ disadvantages in 
German society or not. As this is not feasible for over 20,000 questions we combine human 
and machine coding to identify integration-related PQs. The procedure involved four steps. 
In a first step we pre-defined a list of terms which have been manually extracted from the 
minutes of a parliamentary debate in which integration-related issues were discussed5. We 
also added other terms that we gathered from comprehensive qualitative inspections of the 
PQs. We then used this list of terms to filter the corpus. If, for example, a PQ includes the 
term “Migrationshintergrund” (German for “migratory background”) or any other term in the 
list, this PQ would remain in our filtered corpus. A PQ without any terms on the list would be 
excluded from the corpus.  
In a second step, we combined this filtered corpus with a random sample of remaining, non-
filtered PQs. Two hand coders were familiarised with our definition of substantive 
representation and then were asked to classify each question as either integration-related or 
not5. The intercoder-reliability in form of Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen 1960) between human 
coders was 0.79. All coding disagreements were discussed and recoded after consensus 
accordingly. Additionally, from each validated question, our hand-coders again collected 
specific key terms which indicate that the question is integration-related. We updated the key 
term list accordingly. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
In a third step we used the hand-coded corpus to test our updated key term list for the 
identification of integration-related PQs. By using the updated list of key terms5, 82% of all 
questions in our validated corpus were classified correctly5. In a fourth step we applied our 
updated key term list to all 20,130 PQs, identifying a total of 869 potentially integration-
related questions in the whole corpus. 
One concern with key term-based textual analyses is its susceptibility to falsely capturing 
irrelevant documents (false positives), while at the same time failing to capture relevant 
documents (false negatives). In order to keep such bias at a minimum, we inspected in a final 
step all 869 positives qualitatively in order to discard false positives, which left us with a total 
of 544 PQs as a final measure of integration-related PQs. This amounts to 2.7% of all PQs in 
our corpus.   
Concerns regarding false negatives cannot be quantified to the same extent, but we are 
confident that this does not pose too great a problem to our measurement, given that we have 
included a random subset of the unfiltered corpus in our validation approach in step 2. 
Nevertheless, to be fair, we cannot completely rule out that the captured number of 
integration-related PQs constitutes an underestimation of the real number of integration-







                                                                                                                                                                                     
A2: Final term dictionary to identify questions 
abgeschoben, abschiebehaftbedingungen, abschiebestopps, abschiebung, abschiebungen, 
altübersiedler, aufenthaltstitel, antidiskriminierungsrichtlinie, antidiskriminierungsstelle, 
arbeitserlaubnis, aslybewerberleistungsbezug, assoziationsrecht, asyl, asylantrag, asylantragstellern, 
asylanträge, asylbewerber, asylbewerberinnen, asylbewerberleistungsbezug, 
asylbewerberleistungsgesetz, asylbewerberleistungsgesetzes, asylbewerberleistungsgestz, 
asylbewerberleisungsgesetz, asylbewerbern, asylbewerbers, asylblg, asylsuchende, asylsuchenden, 
asylsuchendenzahlen, asylsuchender, asylsystem, asylsystems, asylverfahren, asylverfahrenrichtlinie, 
asylverfahrensgesetz, asylverfahrensgesetzes, asylverfahrensrecht, asylverfahrensrichtlinie, 
asylverfahrungsgesetz, aufenthaltgesetz, aufenthaltsstatus, aufenthaltserlaubnis, aufenthaltserlaubnisse, 
aufenthaltserlaubnis, aufenthaltsgesetz, aufenthaltsgesetze, aufenthaltsgesetzes, aufenthaltsgestaltung, 
aufenthaltsgewährung, aufenthaltspapiere, aufenthaltsrecht, aufenthaltstitel, ausländer, 
ausländerbeschäftigungsrecht, ausländerförderung, ausländerjagdschein, ausländerzentralregister, 
ausländischer, aussiedler, balkanflüchtlinge, bleiberechtsregelung, bleibeberechtigung, 
bürgerkriegsflüchtlinge, bürgerkriegsflüchtlingen, diskriminierung, doppelstaatlers, 
drittstaatangehörige, drittstaatsangehörige, drittstaatsangehörigen, dublin-ii, 
dublinüberstellungsverfahren, ehegattennachzug, einbürgerung, einbürgerungstest, einbürgerungstests, 
einbürgerungsverhalten, eingebürgert, einreiseerlaubnis, einreisevisum, einwanderern, 
einwanderungsgruppen, eu-aufnahmerichtlinie, eu-aufnahmerichtlinien, fachkräfteanwerbung, 
familiennachzug, familienzusammenführung, familienzusammenführungsrichtlinen, 
familienzusammenführungsrichtlinie, flüchtlinge, flüchtlingen, flüchtlingselend, 
flüchtlingskonvention, flüchtlingslager, frontex, grenzsicherug, grenzübergangsstellen, 
herkunftsfamilie, herkunftsland, herkunftsstaaten, integration, integrationsansprüche, 
integrationsarbeit, integrationscoaching, integrationsfördernd, integrationsförderung, 
integrationsgipfel, integrationsherausforderungen, integrationskurs, integrationskursbeteiligung, 
integrationskurse, integrationskursen, integrationsleistung, integrationsleistungen, 
integrationsministerkonferenz, integrationspolitik, integrationspolitisch, integrationsprogramm, 
integrationsprogramms, integrationsprojekte, integrationssprachkursleiter, integrationstest, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
integrationsunwillig, integrationsverordnung, integriert, interkulturelle bildung, intgegrationsprojekte, 
islam, jugendintegrationskurse, jugendmigrationsdienst, jugendmigrationsdienstes, migranten, 
migrantinnen, migration, migrationsabkommen, migrationsbiographie, migrationshintergrund, 
migrationshintergrund, migrationshintergrundes, minderheitsangehoerige, minderheitsangehörige, 
immigranten, optionskind, optionskinder, optionspflicht, optionspflichtige, rassismus, resettlement-
programms, roma-minderheit, rückführungsabkommen, rückführungsentscheidungen, 
rücknahmeabkommen, rückübernahmeabkommen, rückübernahmeabkommens, rücküberstellung, 
sammelunterkünfte, sammelunterkünften, scheineheverdachts, scheineheverdachtsfälle, 
sprachförderung, sprachkurs, sprachkurse, sprachkursen, sprachtest, spätaussiedler, staatenlose, 
staatsangehörigkeit, staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, staatsangehörigkeitsrecht, staatsbürgerschaft, visa, 
visagebühren, visapflicht, visavergabe, visum, visumantrags, visumanträge, visumbefreiung, 
visumfreiheit, visumgebühren, visums, visumsanträge, visumsbefreiung, visumsfreiheit, 
visumsgebühren, visumspflicht, visumverfahren, zugewandert, zuwanderer, zuwanderern, 
zuwanderung 
A3: Robustness Check 1 – Negative binomial regression models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
     
% Foreign Nationals: 0.06*** 0.06** 0.07*** 0.06*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
District MP: -0.24 -0.33 -0.06  
 (0.30) (0.47) (0.26)  
% Foreign Nationals * District MP:  0.01   
  (0.05)   
     
Reference category: SPD     
CDU/CSU -1.26*** -1.26***   
 (0.42) (0.43)   
FDP -2.76*** -2.76***   
 (0.78) (0.78)   
Greens 0.06 0.06   
 (0.35) (0.35)   
The Left -0.07 -0.05   
 (0.31) (0.31)   
Migrant-related committee 1.04*** 1.04***   
 (0.24) (0.24)   
Migratory background 1.24*** 1.25*** 1.24*** 1.27*** 
 (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) 
     
                                                                                                                                                                                     
     
     
Reference category: Left-wing 
MP/other committee 
    
Left-wing MP/migrant-related    1.12***  
   committee   (0.27)  
Right-wing MP/other committee   -1.42***  
   (0.54)  
Right-wing MP/migrant-related    -0.29  
   committee   (0.69)  
     
Reference category: PR/right-     
wing/other committee     
PR/left-wing/ other committee     2.56** 
    (1.09) 
SMD/left-wing/other committee    2.32** 
    (1.11) 
PR/left-wing/migrant-related    3.60*** 
   committee    (1.08) 
SMD/left-wing/migrant-related    3.68*** 
   committee    (1.09) 
SMD/right-wing/other committee    1.38 
    (1.14) 
PR/right-wing/migrant-related     2.32** 
   committee    (1.18) 
SMD/right-wing/migrant-related     1.57 
   committee    (1.23) 
     
Total no. of PQs 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Intercept -2.48*** -2.44*** -2.63*** -5.13*** 
 (0.40) (0.42) (0.39) (1.09) 
     
Intercept alpha 1.18*** 1.18*** 1.20*** 1.17*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
N 637 637 637 637 
BIC 949.07 955.46 940.30 956.05 
Note: Negative binomial regression models; Table entries show unstandardised coefficients with robust standard 
errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
A4: Robustness Check 2 – Negative binomial regression models only for MPs who asked at least one 
question 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
     
% Foreign Nationals: 0.04*** 0.04 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
District MP: -0.06 -0.26 0.04  
 (0.27) (0.44) (0.24)  
% Foreign Nationals * District MP:  0.02   
  (0.04)   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
     
Reference category: SPD -0.30 -0.31   
CDU/CSU (0.39) (0.40)   
 -1.66*** -1.66***   
FDP (0.72) (0.72)   
 0.14 0.15   
Greens (0.30) (0.30)   
 -0.14 -0.11   
The Left (0.30) (0.31)   
     
Migrant-related committee 0.69*** 0.69***   
 (0.22) (0.22)   
Migratory background 1.07*** 1.10*** 1.10*** 1.13*** 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
     
Reference category: Left-wing MP/other 
committee 
    
Left-wing MP/migrant-related    0.71***  
   committee   (0.24)  
Right-wing MP/other committee   -0.70  
   (0.49)  
Right-wing MP/migrant-related    0.14  
   committee   (0.65)  
     
Reference category: PR/right-     
wing/other committee     
PR/left-wing/ other committee     1.81* 
    (1.04) 
SMD/left-wing/other committee    1.85* 
    (1.07) 
PR/left-wing/migrant-related    2.50** 
   committee    (1.04) 
SMD/left-wing/migrant-related    2.58** 
   committee    (1.06) 
SMD/right-wing/other committee    1.57 
    (1.13) 
PR/right-wing/migrant-related     2.60** 
   committee    (1.12) 
SMD/right-wing/migrant-related     1.60 
   committee    (1.18) 
     
Total no. of PQs 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Intercept -2.04*** -1.96*** -2.14*** -3.91*** 
 (0.31) (0.33) (0.29) (1.05) 
     
INTERCEPT alpha 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.77*** 0.74*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) 
N 387 387 387 387 
BIC 872.64 878.28 864.64 878.21 
Note: Negative binomial regression models; Table entries show unstandardised coefficients with robust standard 
errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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